We present a framework for allocating a global carbon reduction target among nations, in which the concept of ''common but differentiated responsibilities'' refers to the emissions of individuals instead of nations. We use the income distribution of a country to estimate how its fossil fuel CO2 emissions are distributed among its citizens, from which we build up a global CO2 distribution. We then propose a simple rule to derive a universal cap on global individual emissions and find corresponding limits on national aggregate emissions from this cap. All of the world's high CO2emitting individuals are treated the same, regardless of where they live. Any future global emission goal (target and time frame) can be converted into national reduction targets, which are determined by ''Business as Usual'' projections of national carbon emissions and in-country income distributions. For example, reducing projected global emissions in 2030 by 13 GtCO2 would require the engagement of 1.13 billion high emitters, roughly equally distributed in 4 regions: the U.S., the OECD minus the U.S., China, and the non-OECD minus China. We also modify our methodology to place a floor on emissions of the world's lowest CO2 emitters and demonstrate that climate mitigation and alleviation of extreme poverty are largely decoupled.
T he 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) created a 2-tier world. It called upon the developed (''Annex I'') countries to ''take the lead'' in reducing carbon emissions, and, under the principle of ''common but differentiated responsibilities,'' established no time frame for developing countries to follow. However, a consensus is now emerging in favor of low stabilization targets. These targets cannot be achieved without the participation of developing countries, which today emit about half of global CO 2 emissions and whose future emissions increase faster than the emissions of industrialized countries under ''business as usual'' scenarios (1) .
On what terms should developing countries participate? There are many proposals, each buttressed by some appeal to ''fairness.'' Per capita allocation is widely acknowledged to represent the only equitable goal in the long term, but intermediate steps are required in the short-to-medium term. Uniform percentage reductions in emissions across all countries are rightly rejected by all parties, on the grounds that industrialized countries must create headroom for developing countries. Here, we offer a different approach: An allocation of national targets for fossilfuel CO 2 emissions derived from a fairness principle based on the ''common but differentiated responsibilities'' of individuals, rather than nations. Our proposal moves beyond per capita considerations to identify the world's high-emitting individuals, who are present in all countries.
Our approach is designed to blend parsimony, fairness, and pragmatism-treat equally those with the same emissions, wherever they live, and use only national income distributions and economy-wide carbon intensities. National responsibilities are derived by summing the excess emissions of all ''high emitter'' individuals in a country-''high emitters'' are those whose emissions exceed a universal individual emission cap. The scheme does not specify how any nation meets its responsibilities.
Our approach is restricted to future fossil-fuel CO 2 emissions and focuses on the next 2 decades. We do not include biospheric CO 2 , other greenhouse gases, and aerosols, because they are not strongly correlated with personal expenditures and national carbon intensities. By imputing national emissions to individuals, we neglect embedded carbon in exports and imports, a component that is relevant for countries with large shares of trade in their economy. We also do not tackle historical responsibility. These are all important topics, and a complete scheme suitable for use in negotiations would need to take them into account.
Baer et al.
(2) uses a similar approach, but relies on high incomes rather than high emissions and on a fixed income cap at $7500 (PPP adjusted). In contrast, our scheme is based on individual emissions rather than income to reward improvements in national carbon intensity. Several others explore allocation regimes based on convergence of national average per capita emissions in the long-term, typically beyond 2050 (3) (4) (5) , whereas our proposal specifies a transient path that can lead ultimately to long-term convergence.
Individual Emission Distributions. We begin by obtaining a picture of how 26 GtCO 2 of global emissions in 2003 were distributed across the world's 6.2 billion people. We first construct national income distributions from World Bank data (6) . We then convert these income distributions into individual CO 2 emission distributions, assuming unitary elasticity* and anchoring means using country level emissions data. We use present and projected emissions data from the Energy Information Agency (EIA) (7) , a freely available database with geographically disaggregated emissions projections to 2030. Fig. 1 shows how our method works for 2 representative countries, Australia and France. The upper and lower panels report the probability distributions for income and emissions, respectively. Despite having similar incomes, the emission distribution in Australia is shifted to the right of that of France, because Australia has a higher national carbon intensity. The plot shows that Australia hosts more individuals for every level of annual emissions above 10 tCO 2 .
We apply this carbon intensity rescaling procedure to each nation, and we obtain a picture of how individual emissions are distributed globally by summing them up. The global cumulative distribution for 2003 is shown in Fig. 2 Inset. † To develop our approach, we also need the corresponding national and global CO 2 emission distributions for future dates under BAU. For simplicity, we assume that income inequality at the country level does not change over time. We scale the distributions of individual emissions to the projections of regional CO 2 emissions and population, out to 2030, from EIA (7) and UN (8) , respectively. The resulting BAU distribution of the world's 43 GtCO 2 emissions in 2030 across 8.1 billion people is also shown in Fig. 2 .
Sharing Emission Reductions to Achieve a Global Target. Once the world agrees to a global CO 2 emission reduction target, based on a stabilization target, a framework is needed to arrive at national emission allocations. Our approach provides a consistent rule for determining these allocations. A universal cap is imposed on the global individual emission distribution, such that eliminating all emissions above that cap achieves the target (Fig. 2) . The cartoon in Fig. 3 introduces this scheme. The consequences of this cap are country-level emission targets that reflect the number of ''high emitter'' individuals in that country and their aggregate emissions. The universal emission cap achieves equity and fairness in the climate change context in the sense that: (i) countries with a larger proportion of high emitters do more, and (ii) countries with similar emission profiles have similar commitments. Fig. 2 shows how this method works for a specific example: A global fossil-fuel-CO 2 emission target of 30 GtCO 2 in 2030. This case requires a 30% global cut in emissions with respect to BAU for that year and essentially the same global emissions as in 2008. The 2030 individual emission cap is 10.8 tCO 2 , and 1.13 billion people (less than 15% of the 2030 global population) will be above the cap. ‡ The shaded area in Fig. 2 shows the total emission reductions, 13 GtCO 2 . Fig. 2 also shows the individual emission cap for global fossil-fuel-CO 2 emission targets of 20, 25, and 35 GtCO 2 in 2030. § Assuming a 30 GtCO 2 target for 2030, Fig. 4 disaggregates Fig.  2 into the component emission distributions for 4 regions: U.S., OECD minus U.S., China, and the non-OECD minus China. ¶ At the global cap of 30 GtCO 2 , the 4 curves are close together, reflecting the roughly 250 million people above the cap in each of the 4 regions. In Fig. 5 , we show the trajectories from 2003 to 2030, assuming that global emissions peak at 33 GtCO 2 in 2020 and descend linearly to 30 GtCO 2 in 2030. Noticeable departures from BAU for China occur later than for the other 3 regions, reflecting the relative paucity of high emitters in China at present. Table 1 provides detailed results for the 30 GtCO 2 target for 2030 for the 16 regions EIA uses in its projections. We present a full set of corresponding Tables, for emission targets of 20, 25, 30, and 35 GtCO 2 , and for 2020 and 2030, in the supporting information (SI) Appendix.
The universal carbon emission threshold can be converted into an income threshold for each country/region using the appropriate carbon intensity. In 2030, with BAU projections of 43 GtCO 2 of fossil-fuel emissions and a global GDP of 154 trillion † In the SI Appendix, we test a power-law relationship between CO2 emissions and income, seeking a universal exponent ␤ that best fits the historical data. As discussed in the SI, it is estimated that ␤ ϳ 0.7. However, in Figs. 1-7 and Table 1 here, we show a linear relationship ␤ ϭ 1.0, because this value of ␤ is easy to analyze: Each country's emissions distribution is the same as its income distribution with a simple change of units. Also, as seen in the SI Appendix, results for ␤ ϭ 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, and 1.0 are not very different. ‡ ''One billion high emitters'' in the title of our paper comes from this example. The actual number depends on the date, the target, and the scenario used for the projection. As seen in the supporting information, 0.60, 1.76, and 2.45 billions high emitters are involved in 2030 if the targets are 35, 25, and 20 GtCO2, respectively, and if the reference scenario from the EIA Annual International Outlook 2007 (7) is used. ''One billion high emitters'' is our metaphor for a globally coordinated attack on climate change. § A global target for a date as early as 2030 and restricted to fossil fuels cannot be convincingly associated with any specific stabilization target, given the significance of nonfossil fuel emissions, the uncertainty about land sinks, and the many following decades during which the level of effort is unspecified. The 20, 25, and 30 GtCO2 targets for 2030 are intended to be examples of targets that require immediate globally coordinated implementation, thereby making credible the eventual achievement of stringent stabilization targets. ¶ We group countries using OECD rather than Annex I in this paper because, typically, projections of regional growth and emissions define regions using the OECD/non-OECD distinction. dollars (PPP, in year 2000 dollars), each ton of fossil-fuel CO 2 emissions is associated with $3600 of global GDP, and thus the emission cap of 10.8 tCO 2 corresponds to an average global PPP income of about $39,000. The corresponding national income thresholds vary significantly across countries, reflecting variations in national carbon intensity. ʈ
Addressing Poverty Alleviation and Carbon Emission Reductions Si-
multaneously. The approach can be modified to place a floor on individual emissions. For example, a floor of 1 tCO 2 /yr per person exceeds the projected emissions of 2.7 billion individuals in 2030 (one-third of the world population). The 1 tCO 2 /yr floor is roughly consistent with Millennium Development Goals (http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/). Establishing such a floor has the consequence of shielding the lowest one-third of the world's emitters from the CO 2 reduction strategies that will need to permeate the activities of the other two-thirds of the world's population to achieve significant global CO 2 emission reductions (9) . The world's lowest emitters would not be thwarted from obtaining diesel engines to produce their first electricity for lighting, television, and the charging of batteries; gasoline fuel for their first motorized transport; and liquid petroleum gas for their first modern cooking fuel-where these technologies are the lowest-cost options.
The consequences of a 1 tCO 2 floor for the mitigation required of the other two-thirds of the world's population are small, as Fig. 6 shows. See the cap, labeled ''30P,'' that results when a floor of 1 tCO 2 in 2030 is in place and the 2030 global emission target of 30 GtCO 2 is retained. To compensate for the additional 1.5 GtCO 2 of reductions by high emitters required to create such a floor, the universal cap is 9.6 tCO 2 (down from 10.8 tCO 2 ) and the number of ''high emitters'' is 1.30 billion (up from 1.13 billion). The message of Fig. 6 is that addressing climate change mitigation and meeting the basic energy needs of the global poor are nearly decoupled objectives.
ʈ According to the EIA (7) , each ton of fossil-fuel CO2 emissions in 2003 was associated with $2000 of global GDP. Accordingly, EIA projects a CO2 intensity of the global economy (emissions/GDP) that decreases by 43% between 2003 and 2030 in their BAU scenario. This corresponds to a 2.1% reduction per year-faster than the 1.8% per year reduction observed during the 1990 -2003 period. Targets for emissions reductions necessitate still faster reductions, achieved by carbon intensity reductions beyond those embedded in BAU. For example, achieving a 30 GtCO2/yr target in 2030 produces a global economy where each ton of fossil-fuel CO2 is associated with $5100 of global GDP, i.e., a 3.4% reduction per year in global carbon intensity. In Table 1 , the ninth and tenth columns show the national/ regional emission allocations when the 2030 target is modified to include this 1 tCO 2 emission floor. The U.S. target falls by 0.34 GtCO 2 (10%) and the African target rises by 0.8 GtCO 2 (54%). Fig. 7 provides a summary of the national mitigation effort for 7 major regions in 2030. The bars show that the U.S. and China have the 2 highest CO 2 abatement assignments. India mostly gets a free pass, but not Africa, due to high carbon intensity and inequality in South Africa and in North African nations with energy industries. Russia and the Middle East get sizeable mitigation assignments for the same reasons.
Summary of Results.
The 5 GtCO 2 increments from the weakest to the most stringent global policy are taken up differently by different regions. The mild global target of 35 GtCO 2 affects the U.S. more than the other regions; the U.S. has 185 million of the world's 600 million people whose emissions exceed the relatively high (16.8 tCO 2 /year) individual cap of this policy. The additional emission cuts to comply with more stringent global targets decline for the U.S. but remain constant for China and Europe, (green area at the right). The red strip at the left between the ''30'' and ''30P'' arrows shows the extra reduction required of the high emitters to provide the headroom to achieve this floor. Relative to the same climate goal without a poverty provision (''30''), the cap that includes this poverty alleviation objective (''30P'') is lowered from 10.8 to 9.6 tCO 2, and 1. reflecting the progressive involvement of all regions as the individual emission cap tightens. Fig. 7 shows that allowing for the poverty provision of 1 tCO 2 changes most national targets very little. An exception is Africa, which, as a result of its large carbon-poor population, now gets significantly higher allocations.
The regional targets resulting from our poverty floor can be compared to the ones resulting from an equal-per capita (EPC) allocation scheme, where the 30 GtCO 2 global emission target for 2030 is divided equally among the world's expected 8.1 billion people, resulting in a universal individual allowance of 3.7 tCO 2 . (In the language of our proposal, the EPC allocation scheme lowers the individual emission cap and raises the poverty floor to the same value, here, for 2030, 3.7 tCO 2 /person.) Fig. 7 shows that all regions receive a more stringent target in the EPC scheme, with the exception of India and Africa, whose emission targets are significantly larger and roughly equal-due to their similar 2030 populations.
Discussion and Conclusions
The approach presented in this paper is motivated by the reality that emissions from OECD countries and from countries outside the OECD are now roughly equal, and therefore tough global atmospheric stabilization targets require the participation of the developing countries. In our interpretation of fairness, individuals who emit similar amounts of CO 2 , regardless of where they live, are expected to contribute to fossil-fuel CO 2 emission reductions in similar ways. In principle, no country gets a pass, because even in the poorest countries some individuals have CO 2 emissions above the universal emission cap.
A well-designed national policy would contain costs and not exacerbate inequalities. Many of the lowest-cost opportunities for CO 2 emission reduction over the next few decades in all countries, especially in the developing countries, will be found in the middle of the emission distribution, associated with billions of people of modest means. Many of them will be moving into cities for the first time and, in a CO 2 -responsive economy, would be housed in well-built apartment buildings equipped with efficient appliances and served by efficient mass transit systems. Thus, pursuing CO 2 emission reduction across a wide swath of a country's economy is likely to be preferable to capping the emissions of the high emitters only, as could be inferred from a literal interpretation of the horizontal cutoff in Fig. 2 .
Of the countless directions for further work, we note here only a few. It is important to develop more refined tools that reveal the high emitters in developing countries now hidden in the tails of the distributions-for example, in India. Direct measurement of the individual emission distribution using specially designed household surveys may achieve this objective. A better under-standing of changes in distributions over time, including the connection between the shape and growth of the emission distribution and the rate (and acceleration) of economic growth, would improve BAU emission projections. The detailed consequences of our scheme for international trading of emission allocations should be investigated and compared with EPC and other schemes.
To review, our scheme requires only a globally agreed emission target and consensus regarding national BAU emissions. ** Nations derive their obligations from the emissions of their high-emitting citizens, but are left free to decide on implementation policies at national and international levels. It easily accommodates periodic updating as projections of national emissions are revised and improved information about income and emission distributions is obtained. Our scheme does not take into account emissions from land use and non-CO 2 greenhouse gases, emissions embedded in the trade of goods and services, † † differences in regional climate and country size, inertia restricting rates of change, and prior ''legacy'' emissions. ‡ ‡ Our scheme can be viewed as a step toward allocation on the basis of equal per capita emission rights, but we do not get there in one step. We take into account high emitters above a global cap and low emitters below a global floor, but there is a gap between the cap and the floor. Further application of the underlying principles proposed here would bring about successive reductions of the high-emitter cap and increases of the emission floor, until eventually they converge.
Perhaps our allocation framework can enrich the search for fair and uniform allocation rules governing the international post-2012 regime for climate change mitigation.
** Substantial revisions of emission projections are now underway to take into account the current global recession, see for example http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/. † † See for example refs. 10 and 11 for estimates of the emissions embodied in international trade of goods. ‡ ‡ Usually, legacy emissions refer to past emissions of nations. In a scheme like ours, which is based on the emissions of individuals, legacy might be incorporated by redefining ''high emitters'' as those individuals with high lifetime emissions prior to a specific year.
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Methodology
We build a global distribution of individual carbon emissions by linking income distributions to national fossil fuel emissions. Three main steps are involved.
• We fit income/consumption distributions using quintiles or deciles data at the country level, for the last available year for which the survey is available in a given country.
• We rescale them to match their nation per capita GDP (in PPP) of 2003.
• Assuming income and emissions are related by a power law, we translate them into emission distributions, ensuring that the averages match the national emission inventories.
In doing so, we attribute all production-based national emissions to their individuals on the basis of their income, although not necessarily in constant proportions. That is, we assume that the emissions generated by government consumption and the investments in the economy are attributed to individuals according to their income, in the same way those deriving directly or indirectly from consumption. The scheme ignores emissions embedded in international (more precisely, inter-regional) trade. The next subsections explore the three steps in some detail.
Income/Consumption Distributions from Decile Data for Individual Countries
The distribution data from WDI is in the form of income/consumption 1 A plot of the cumulative income/consumption share vs. the cumulative population distribution is called the Lorenz curve (see Figure S1 ). We use a sum of two Gamma probability density functions (PDFs) to model the population distribution as a function of income. Our rationale for using Gamma PDFs is that it facilitates a sensitivity analysis of the simplifying assumptions in the main text. All functions of the form x n G(x, a, b) of the Gamma PDF G(x, a, b) are also Gamma PDFs (for example, the income distribution is the case where n = 1). The population distribution can be obtained by a simple non-linear least square fit of the modeled Lorenz curve with distribution data. We also note that if CO 2 emissions elasticity with respect to (w.r.t.) income is some constant β then the population distribution can be easily converted to a function of CO 2 emissions using generalized Gamma PDFs (see Section 3).
Gamma probability density functions or PDFs (G(x, a, b)) and cumulative distribution functions or CDFs (CG(x, a, b)) are:
where
x a−1 e −x dx and Γ(a + 1) = aΓ(a).
Figure S1: The WDI data and 2-Gamma Fit Lorenz curve for Indonesia.
Recall that we are dealing with probability density functions here, so the CDF should integrate to 1.
The Gamma PDF has an interesting property under scaling of x-axis:
This property is very useful as we can fit the Gamma function to income normalized w.r.t. to GDP per capita (I) and then scale the distribution and the x axis to the real income. More importantly, the Lorenz curve is a function of a only. So we can scale b to produce income distributions that have the same inequality (or Lorenz curve) but different GDP per capita. This property is used to project income distributions into the future using projections of GDP per capita and assuming, conservatively, no change in inequality. For the CDF, we have:
Henceforth, we use x to denote income in units of GDP per capita (I) and z = Ix to denote income in PPP dollars. The income share (IG(x, a, b)) and cumulative income share (ICG(x, a, b)) are (using (1) and (2)): xG(x, a, b) = abCG(x, a + 1, b).
We use the trial 2-Gamma PDF for income (normalized w.r.t. GDP per capita I):
The 2-Gamma fit after scaling the distribution from normalized income x to real income z using (4) , and multiplying by population N is: Figure S2 shows the 2-Gamma distribution that we obtain from the fit shown in Figure S1 . 
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Emissions Elasticities from Surveys
Here we look at the elasticity of energy or emissions vs. consumption expenditure from various studies (See Table S1 ). These studies consider both direct energy use in households and energy embodied in goods and services consumed in households. The approach, first developed by Robert Herendeen in the 1970s, combines household income and/or consumption expenditure surveys with emissions or energy statistics and input-output table data. Household expenditure in different consumption categories are converted to emissions/ energy use using input-output data. This can be considered a 'bottom-up' approach to the question of the emissions elasticity w.r.t income or consumption expenditure. In the next subsection we consider a 'top-down' approach to the issue using income distributions and emissions data. The elasticity of energy use with expenditure is not strictly comparable with the emissions elasticity. Nonetheless, in most countries both elasticities vary from 0.7 to 1. Emissions in different countries at the same level of household consumption expenditure vary significantly. In the subsequent analysis we will primarily use an elasticity of 1 and consider other elasticities (0.7-1) for sensitivity analyzes. Most results do not vary by more than 20% so the linear elasticity assumption is used to keep the discussion intuitively simple. Note again that we use income distributions anchored to the average GDP per capita instead of the consumption measured in the household surveys. 
'Top-down' Estimation of the Income Elasticity of Emissions
We have attempted a 'top-down' analysis of a panel of countries using emission data from EIA, GDP and population data from PWT6.2, and income inequality data from WIID2b. First, we do a simple maximal likelihood analysis where we fit a function of the form
where c it is the per capita emission of country i in year t, A i is a country specific constant, β is a universal constant, andĪ it is the GDP per capita in country i and year t.There are 43 time series (one for each country) with at least 5 years of data in the period 1980-2004 adding up to 410 'sets'. Each 'set' contains GDP per capita, average annual emissions, and decile income shares for a particular country in a given year. We maximize the loglikelihood function of normally distributed observations with a linearly increasing heteroskedastic standard deviation σ(Ī it ) which is a function of the GDP per capitaĪ it . σ(Ī) which is a straight line is parameterized by its values at two points: σ(Ī = 0) and σ(Ī = 50000).
The country specific A i can be derived by setting the derivative of ln with max ln L = −217.244. This simple analysis is the equivalent of assuming that every country is a representative individual whose income in year t isĪ it with an emissions to income elasticity of β. We repeat the same analysis using income distribution data at the decile level to fit a function of the form
where I itf is the mean income in f th decile (or quintile). The loglikelihood estimator is
ln L is maximized at
x(1) * = β = 0.724, x(2) * = 0.055 and x(3) * = 2.007
with max ln L = −215.452. It is reassuring, that (12) provides a substantially better fit than (10) , because this shows that the national-level data carry a substantial signal of the distribution of individual emissions. If we assumed that the two models were equally probable before the analysis (equal prior probabilities), then the data make the model behind (12) approximately six times more likely than the one behind (10) (the posterior probabilities differ by a factor of e 1.79 /1). 2 It is also reassuring that three different methods give us approximately the same estimated value of β. The most common value from bottom-up household surveys, and the estimates from the top-down methods behind (10) and (12), all are between 0.7 and 1. Nonetheless, it is possible that all of these methods undercount the emissions of the wealthy, primarily due to non-response to surveys and undercounting of indirect emissions from services, dividend income etc. For this reason, we have we performed all of the analyses in this paper for four values of β -0.7, 0.8, 0.9 and 1.0 (see Sections 3.2 and 3.3) -and found that all of the paper's findings are quite insensitive to β. Also, the case with β = 1 is easiest to extend to other data sets and to analyze because each country's emissions distribution is then just its income distribution with a simple change of units. For all of these reasons, we present analyses in which β = 1 in the main text.
Emissions Distributions for Different Elasticities
The use of Gamma PDFs also makes it easy to transform the population density w.r.t. income to one w.r.t. to CO 2 emissions. The Gamma PDF is modified to a generalized Gamma PDF. Suppose the CO 2 emissions to income relationship for a given country has the functional form
where c β (z) is the annual CO 2 emissions and we assume a power law function of income z.
The distribution of emissions as a function of income (using the population distribution F (z), see (8)) is c β (z)F (z). Note that the income distribution is a special case where β = A = 1. The β moment distribution of a Gamma PDF is another Gamma PDF.
Multiplying both sides of equation (13) with the 2-Gamma fit F (z) (see (8)), and using (3) and (14), we obtain
where, C is the CO 2 emissions per capita and N is the population of the country. The above identity provides us with an explicit value for A β . This gives us, on changing variables (and dropping the β subscript): z(c) = (Ac) γ where γ = 1/β.
Substituting z using (16) in (8) will give us the probability density function in terms of CO 2 emissions. This replaces the Gamma function with generalized Gamma functions. A generalized Gamma function GG(y, β, a,b) is
The generalized Gamma function is related to the Gamma function (by definition) as,
The population density in terms of CO 2 emissions c is 
Using k = 1 and (20)
We now have all that we need to fit distributions with different elasticities (see Figure S3 ). 
Projecting Emission Distributions and Caps
This Section explores how we calculate individual caps in the future. It reports first on the projection procedure and then on the way global caps are computed. The importance of the relation between expenditures and emissions is evaluated via sensitivity analysis. Tables at the regional level for 2020 and 2030 for several global emission constraints are provided in Section 3.1 and a few comparisons are made to regional targets currently under discussion.
To obtain a picture of the future, we first need forecasts of regional population and emissions. We use the EIA International Energy Outlook (IEO), as it is a widely used and freely available source of projections. However, the methodology can be straightforwardly replicated using alternative projections, with different regional disaggregation and temporal horizon. Results in this paper are based on IEO 2007. 3 We estimate the country level emissions distributions for 2003 (see Section 2.1) using the most recent income distributions available (as of 2003). We make two main assumptions for emissions projection: 1) no change in income inequality at the country level and 2) a single constant global elasticity of emissions to consumption. 4 Both assumptions are crude approximations of reality. Wealth distribution has changed in the past 30 years, especially in countries that have experienced profound economic transformations. However, within-country inequality projections are not available, to our knowledge. Accordingly, we adopt the 'future equals past' rule of thumb. As for emissions/expenditure elasticities, values vary across countries as shown in Table S1 , but very few estimates exist for developing countries. In Sections 3.2 and 3.3 we will perform some sensitivity analysis where this elasticity is a parameter.
Universal Caps
We begin by summing over the country-level emissions distributions (developed in Section 2.2) to obtain regional distributions corresponding to the 16 regions used in EIA's projections (see Appendix A for region definitions). Using EIA's regional emissions growth rates, we project these regional distributions forward in time to obtain a global distribution of emissions. We can then easily compute a maximum individual cap above which all emissions are eliminated. The universal emissions cap for a global emission reduction target is obtained from the Lorenz plot of cumulative BAU emissions vs. cumulative population by finding the tangent to the curve that is consistent with the envisioned target. The linearity of the tangent ensures constant individual emissions, at the rate given by its slope. Figure 4 illustrates the general method for the case explored in the main text, where the date is 2030 and we assume an elasticity of 1.0. Keeping world emissions below the target requires that each of 1.13 Billion people is assigned a 10.8 tCO 2 cap.
The corresponding cap for the '30P' scenario where we provide for an emissions floor of 1 tCO 2 per capita are obtained similarly. The extra emissions required to be set aside for the 1 tCO 2 floor is subtracted from the 30 GtCO 2 global target to calculate the new individual emissions cap. From any universal cap, we obtain regional allocations (both the number of people under the regional cap and the required regional emissions reduction) by finding the vertical intercept on the regional Lorenz plot of a line with the slope of the universal cap slope (the same procedure as shown in Figure S4 ).
In Table S2 we compare the regional target in 2030 for the two schemes proposed in this paper, and the 'equal per capita' approach. In the ' equal per capita' scheme, allocations are based on global emissions divided equally among the 8.1 billion global citizens. This expands on Figure  7 in the paper. In Tables S3-S10, we report projected emissions targets at the regional level for global targets in 2020 and 2030. In 2020 the global targets are 20 GtCO 2 , 25 GtCO 2 , 30 GtCO 2 and 33 GtCO 2 . In 2030 the global targets are the global targets are 20 GtCO 2 , 25 GtCO 2 , 30 GtCO 2 and 35 GtCO 2 ; 30 GtCO 2 is the target explored in the main text. All Tables assume an emissions elasticity of 1.0 w.r.t. income. The Tables show results with and without a floor for low-emitters. Inasmuch as the task of creating and raising a floor is likely to be a multi-decade task, we assume a floor for all the worlds individuals of 0.5 tCO 2 for 2020 and 1.0 tCO 2 for 2030. We can compare specific results in these Tables to two recently proposed climate policies. The European Commission has proposed a regional target of 3.3 GtCO 2 for 2020, a 20% emission reduction with respect to 1990s levels. 5 Associating the European Commission territory with the OECD-Europe region, our Tables reveal that this goal is roughly consistent with the '25P' scenario in 2020. The Lieberman-Warner Security Act envisions long-term emissions reductions for the U.S. that, according to EIA estimates, correspond to 5.5 GtCO 2 and 4 GtCO 2 targets, 10% above and 20% below 1990 levels, for 2020 and 2030 respectively. 6 These U.S. goals correspond to the demands of a global cap between '30P' and '35P' in the decade 2020-2030. Europe's proposed commitment corresponds to a tighter global target in our allocation scheme than the U.S. commitment does. This is due to the fact that 1) Europe's commitment is an intrinsically tighter regional target compared to the U.S. and 2) our allocation scheme projects more stringent cuts in emissions from the U.S. than Europe as the U.S. has higher average emissions and a higher number of high emitters. 
Sensitivity of the Global Cap to the Emissions Elasticity.
For sake of simplicity, throughout the main text we assume proportionality between emissions and expenditures (an elasticity of 1.0), a world where two persons whose expenditures differ by 10% will also differ by 10% in their emissions. Here we explore the consequences of other relationships between emissions and expenditures by treating the corresponding elasticity as a parameter. An elasticity lower than unity is a situation where the poor spend a higher fraction of their consumption budget on energy and emissions than the rich do, a situation where a flat carbon tax would be regressive. We assume a constant global β but let it take the values, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 and 1.0. Figures S5 and S6 show the effect of changing the β = 1.0 rule on the global population distribution and the global emissions distributions, respectively. For both 2003 and 2030, aggregate emissions of the low emitters increase as β falls, as expected. Note the five-fold change of horizontal scale between Figure S5 and Figure S6 , expressing the large share of global emissions coming from the highest emitters. Figure 6 shows the expected high-emitter effect of lower β: Lower values of β are associated with lower aggregate emissions by the emitters above 25 tCO 2 /yr in 2030.The effect of various expenditure-emission elasticities on the 2020 and the 2030 universal cap is shown in Table S11 . The global emissions target ranges from 20 to 35 GtCO 2 , and the world does and doesn't have a poverty floor of 0.5 tCO 2 in 2020 and 1.0 tCO 2 in 2030. The individual emissions caps in Table S11 for 2030 are derived from Figure S7 using the method described in subsection 3.1 (see Figure S4 ). We see that the individual cap tightens with a decrease in elasticity. This happens because with a lower elasticity a larger share of emissions comes from the middle of the distribution. The cap for an elasticity of 0.7 is 10% to 25% lower than for an elasticity of 1.0, for the same target.
Sensitivity of Regional Emissions Projections to the Emissions Elasticity
In Figures S8-S23 we show the variation in regional emissions with change in the elasticity of emissions: β. We show the projections for β = 1.0, β = 0.9, β = 0.8 and β = 0.7, with β assumed to be the same for all countries. We also show the range of projected emissions with a random β for each country, sampled independently from a uniform distribution in the interval 0.7 ≤ β ≤ 1.0.
Some broad patterns emerge from the sensitivity analysis. As shown in Figure S3 , reducing the elasticity β from 1.0 to 0.7 has the effect of making a country's emissions distribution more equitable, thereby increasing the number of people whose emissions are close to the per capita value, and reducing the number of very low and very high emitters. As a result, the emissions of different regions varies significantly. Regions with a large number of high emitters, especially those whose average emissions are significantly above the cap see a further reduction in total allocated emissions as a higher fraction of the population is under the cap (U.S., Russia, Canada etc.). Regions where most of the people emit significantly below the cap see an increase in total allocated emissions with decrease in β as the number of people above the cap decreases (Africa, India etc.). The results are intermediate for regions between these two extremes. The blue and pink rectangles show the range of regional emissions allocations that may be expected in 2020
and 2030, respectively, if we allow countries to have emissions distributions that have different emissions elasticities (randomly distributed between 0.7 and 1.0).
How to read Figures S8-S23 ?
The figures are all in same format so we provide some extended notes here. The primary difference between the 'P' and the 'non-P' scenarios is that regions with a large number of people who emit below the poverty floor (0.5 GtCO 2 in 2020, and 1.0 GtCO 2 in 2030) are allowed higher emissions. Since the global target remains the same, the individual cap is lower, and other regions have to make more stringent reductions. So, Africa gets to emit more and the U.S. has more stringent reductions.
We also highlight the difference between the 2020 and 2030 regional emissions targets for the same global emissions target ('25P' in 2020 vs. '25P' in 2030, for example). Regions that already have high emitters as a large fraction of their population in 2003 have 2030 emissions targets that are lower than the 2020 targets (the OECD countries except Mexico, Russia and the Transition Economies). This observation is a consequence of two factors: 1) Stable or declining populations and 2) tighter individual caps for the same global targets in 2030, compared to 2020.
Most of the other regions see higher emissions in 2030 compared to 2020 though they might see a reduction compared to BAU. Most of the individuals in these regions have emissions below the 2020 caps. When emissions are rising at a fast pace as a result of population growth and economic development, the increase in emissions from those below the cap can be much higher than any decrease from those above the cap. This remains true even if the cap in 2030 is lower than the cap in 2020. The paper introduces an emission floor to allow the 2.7 billion people in 2030 with the lowest personal emissions to increase their annual emissions to 1 tCO2 by 2030. This provision corresponds approximately to a 1.5 GtCO 2 decrease in the allowance for the high emitters, or about a 10% increase of the global task of reducing 2030 emissions to 30 GtCO 2 relative to BAU. This section aims to show that an emission of 1 tCO 2 per person in a year allows for somewhat more than the standard of living portrayed in the academic literature of Basic Human Needs (1). We approach the issue from two perspectives. First, we relate 1 tCO 2 /person-year to current emissions and future targets from a top-down perspective, relating this emissions level to human development and the stabilization of the atmospheric CO 2 concentration. Second, we provide a bottom-up analysis of what 1 tCO 2 per person per year would provide in terms of energy services.
'Top-down' perspective: Table S12 shows the number of people who emit less than 0.5 tCO 2 and less than 1 tCO 2 per year, as well as their cumulative emissions, based on the methodology described in the main text, for 2003 and 2030. The Table shows that between 2003 and 2030, under BAU conditions, both the number of low emitters and their total emissions remain roughly the same-indicating that global economic growth has no perceptible impact on the low-emissions tail, which is simply shifted to the right (see the inset to Figure 1 of the main text)-i.e., poverty is not reduced substantially under BAU. Table S12 : Number of people who have individual emissions lower than 0.5 and 1 tCO 2 /yr, and their total emissions. Data based on the BAU distributions discussed in the main text.
In this context, it is interesting to compare some indices for national development with percapita CO 2 emissions. The most commonly used index for development is the UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI combines purely economic data (GDP per capita) with data on other development indicators (2) , such as adult literacy rate, school enrollment ratios, and life expectancy at birth. In Figure S24 we plot per capita average national CO 2 emissions against HDI for a number of countries and learn that a per capita emission of 1 tCO2 corresponds roughly with the transition into an "inelastic regime," where an increase in emissions gives little gains in HDI (3). In contrast, for countries with per capita average emissions below 1 tCO2, there is a great potential for rapid increases in HDI, and thus in human development, with only a small increase in emissions. To be sure, achieving a floor of 1 tCO 2 /person on the emissions of all individuals in any coun-try guarantees that its per capita emissions will be above 1 tCO 2 /capita. Nonetheless, Figure  S24 assures us that 1 tCO 2 is a floor on personal emissions relevant to human development. An entirely different way to view 1 tCO 2 /capita is to look ahead to the time when the world has stabilized greenhouse gas concentrations. By the end of this century, for a wide range of post-SRES scenarios with CO 2 stabilization targets below twice the preindustrial concentration, global emissions will need to be approximately 10 GtCO 2 per year (4), assuming that net CO 2 emissions from land use are close to neutral and direct air capture of CO 2 negligible. Thus, for a world population of approximately 8-10 billion people at the time of stabilization (5), the global per capita emission level should hardly be more than 1 tCO 2 /yr. Accordingly, 1 tCO2 per person per year is the emission level that emerges from many analyses of international convergence. By implication, the energy system must change dramatically in order for stabilization to be compatible with global economic growth.
'Bottom-up' perspective:
The people who are helped by the 1 tCO 2 individual emissions floor are the world's poorest, and it needs to be assessed how 1 tCO 2 relates to an exit from poverty. Whether any specific target group will actually be able to reach an emissions level of 1 tCO 2 depends on a number of issues, including the success of international efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (6) and potential successor development targets and the successful implementation of associated domestic policies. Table S13 : Basic human needs per person. They consist of low levels of private and some communal electricity use, and about one canister (14 kg) per month for cooking. The household size is 4.5. For electricity, the emission factor is based on IEA's (7) estimate of average CO 2 emissions from electricity generation (4.652 GtCO 2 /yr) and electricity consumption (4966 TWh/yr) in developing countries.
A.K.N. Reddy and his collaborators have assessed energy requirements for "Basic Human Needs" (1). As typical values, we assume one 14 kg canister of liquid petroleum gas (LPG) per household per month and roughly 200 kWh per household per year for electricity (see Table  S13 ). Electricity consumption, for example, could be accounted for by three 11-W compact 38 fluorescent bulbs and a 100-W fan or a small television, all operated 4 hours/day. At this stage, we make no allowance for energy needed for transportation nor for community-level power (e.g., for a school or health clinic). The CO 2 consequences per person, assuming 4.5 persons per household, are shown in Table S13 . Table S14 : Extended human energy needs per person. The same cooking demand is assumed as in Table S13 , an estimate for transport is added, and the balance is assigned to electricity. As in Table S13 , the household size is 4.5 and the emission factor for electricity is 0.937 kgCO 2 /kWh. The transport assumptions are 113 gCO 2 /vehicle-km and 2 passengers/vehicle for the two-wheeler, 920 gCO 2 /vehicle-km and 40 passengers/vehicle for the bus, and 196 gCO 2 /vehicle-km and 5 passengers/vehicle for the shared car.
The emissions from direct energy use are about 160 kgCO 2 /person-year. In the Basic Human Needs literature, these estimates of "direct" energy use are multiplied by a factor to take into account the "indirect" energy use associated with energy embodied in the purchases of non-energy goods and services, such as tools, clothing, and other intersections with the market economy (1, 9) . A factor of 2 for this multiplier was developed in Figure 3 .6 of (1) and in (7) . Using it here gives a total of 320 kgCO 2 /person year for Basic Human Needs. Evidently, there is considerable room for additional consumption within the quota of 1 tCO 2 /person-yr, resulting in a standard of living somewhat better than that of a person who has satisfied only Basic Human Needs.
We illustrate how this gap might be filled in Table S14 , first by adding emissions associated with a representative demand for transport and then filling in the balance with electricity. We retain the two-to-one ratio for total vs "direct" emissions. Our estimate is that a little over 200 kg CO 2 /person year of direct emissions are associated with transport. This follows from the assumption that, on average, one person in a household will travel 15 km/day (5 km/day each in a motorized two-wheeler, a bus, and a shared car). Vehicle emission factors and load factors are given in Table S14 .
After allowing for transport emissions, there is room for an expansion of power consumption from 200 kWh/household-year value in Table S13 to about 794 kWh/household-year in Table  S14 . Electricity usage of 794 kWh/household-year is consistent with Reference 3 for achieving the "elastic development threshold". Compared to the smaller electricity use for Basic Human Needs in Table S13 , it would allow for the operation of more lights, a refrigerator, an additional TV or fan, and some commercial activities.
